Introduction
Foot and mouth disease (FMD) is the most important of the Office International des Epizooties (OIE: World organisation for animal health) List A diseases due to the effect the disease has on trade (1, 22) . In the past, the disease has ravaged European livestock, but has been gradually brought under control, at great cost, by preventive vaccination programmes, supplemented by destruction of infected herds in most of the countries of continental Europe and, in the United Kingdom (UK) and Nordic countries, by destruction of infected herds alone.
Between 1962 and the late 1980s, cattle populations were vaccinated annually in most countries in continental Europe and the number of outbreaks due to endemic strains of foot and mouth diseases virus (FMDV) diminished gradually (Fig. 1) .
During this period, the European Commission for the Control of Foot and Mouth Disease (EUFMD Commission) focused efforts on preventing the introduction of the exotic strains of FMDV into Europe by establishing a buffer zone in the Thrace region of Turkey.
Y. Leforban (1) & G. Gerbier Despite these occasional incursions of FMD into south-east Europe, in all cases, the control measures were efficient and the disease never spread to such an extent as to become endemic. In Italy in 1993 and in Greece in 1994 and 1996, the disease was controlled by stamping-out ( Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 3,500 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Years Number of outbreaks Vaccination ban and in the Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of Macedonia, in 1996, ring vaccination was carried out in addition to the sanitary measures taken (Fig. 5 ). The two single outbreaks, which occurred in Bulgaria in 1993 and 1996, were controlled respectively by stamping-out and ring vaccination, and by stamping-out and restriction of animal movements only.
A major outbreak which affected 2,030 farms occurred in the UK between February and September 2001. This was the first major epidemic of FMD in Europe since preventive vaccination had been abandoned in continental Europe in 1991. The disease was eventually controlled by stamping-out of infected herds and flocks and pre-emptive culling on neighbouring and contact farms. This outbreak resulted in major economic losses and massive destruction of infected as well as healthy animals, with a negative impact on public opinion in the UK and in Europe. The disease also spread to Ireland, France and the Netherlands although the number of outbreaks was limited in these countries. This led the EU to re-examine current policies and to look for alternative measures to the massive culling of animals for disease control purposes. An international conference was convened in Brussels on 12-13 December 2001
for this purpose and the policy of Europe is currently under review to ensure that such a dramatic outbreak will not occur again.
This paper is intended to review the history of FMD in Europe and to draw lessons from this history on how to reduce the risk of introduction of the disease into Europe. The paper also includes a review of the situation of FMD in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in the recent past.
History of foot and mouth disease in Europe

Foot and mouth disease in Europe up to the 1950s
Foot and mouth disease has been known in Europe for centuries. The European Continent has repeatedly been affected by diseases originating in the Middle East, Asia and sometimes Africa. This is particularly true for FMD. The pattern of the disease has been characterised in the past by periodic epizootics which were often the obvious extension of situations prevailing in neighbouring regions. Disastrous epizootics swept across the continent at intervals of five to ten years and involved large numbers of susceptible animal populations. Between epizootic waves, the disease continued to occur, sporadically or endemically, in those regions with high animal concentrations or animal movements (16) .
Eastern Europe was severely exposed, until 1910, to disease outbreaks occurring in Asia, from where epizootics used to sweep westward across Russia.
In the past, infection also originated in North Africa (5), the most dramatic example being the 1937-1939 epizootic which occurred in France and rapidly spread into Europe. This most ravaging panzootic caused some two million outbreaks on the continent where the most severely affected countries were Germany (700,000 outbreaks), France (378,000 outbreaks), the Netherlands (265,000 outbreaks), Czechoslovakia (240,000 outbreaks), Poland (234,000 outbreaks) and Belgium (102,000 outbreaks). During this epizootic, the Waldmann inactivated vaccine was tested in the field in Germany with promising results (2).
After the Second World War, all three European types, i.e. O, A, C, of the disease continued to be endemic in various countries. During this period, the disease was usually contained by ring vaccination.
The last true panzootic occurred in 1951, when a new subtype (A5) of type A virus found ideal conditions for spread in western Europe. A massive spread of outbreaks started in the Rhine region while the causal virus had been isolated one year earlier in south-eastern Europe. In two years, over 900,000 outbreaks were declared, the most affected countries being Italy (430,000 outbreaks), France (330,000 outbreaks), the Netherlands (280,000 outbreaks), the Federal Republic of Germany (204,000 outbreaks), Belgium (59,000 outbreaks), Greece (57,000 outbreaks) and Denmark (28,000 outbreaks). to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) inquiries, to US$600 million but losses would have been higher had vaccination not succeeded in blocking or slowing down the course of the disease in several countries. After this episode, governments realised that individual action was insufficient to bring FMD under control, and co-ordinated efforts at the European level were needed (6).
The 1950s mark the advent of mass vaccination, systematically applied over large European regions and, as a result, the decline of disease incidence in a steadily increasing number of countries (Fig. 1) . From epizootics, the disease pattern changed to regional involvement and later, to sporadic occurrence. As a result of these achievements, the point major vulnerability shifted to the south-east where conditions combine with persisting exposure to infections raging uncontrolled in the Near East. The most vulnerable country is Turkey, with the Anatolian peninsula open to infections along 2,000 km of border. With animal production concentrated in eastern Anatolia and the consumption centres located in western Turkey, the trend has been for epizootics to spread through animals and meat supplies from the east of the country to reach the Bosphorus area.
The indiscriminate introduction into the Near East of slaughter animals originating from infected countries in eastern Africa, Asia and elsewhere also constitutes a significant hazard, keeping Europe under a permanent threat of invasion, especially by exotic types and subtypes of the virus. -immediate objective: establishment of a buffer zone of vaccination in Thrace where favourable physical conditions exist for concentrating efforts in a relatively small and easily defensible area -middle-term objective: to develop technical infrastructures, including vaccine production units, which would allow a shift of the buffer zone system to eastern Anatolia at a later stage -long-term objective: strengthening of the surveillance and control of the disease in Turkey.
Between 1962 and 1987, thirty vaccination campaigns were carried out either to establish or to maintain buffer zones in Thrace and in south-eastern Europe.
These campaigns were conducted in response to the threat of exotic virus to Europe (Fig. 2 Parallel to the FAO-EUFMD campaigns, action was taken by the Soviet Union and Romania to protect their frontier areas against invasion by exotic viruses. The latter action, which also contributed to the defense of Europe, is not dealt with here (7).
1989-1991, moving towards a non-vaccination policy
At the end of the 1980s, the European Commission (EC) decided to implement a single policy for the then twelve EU member countries to facilitate the exchange of animals and animal products within the Union. The agreed policy was to move towards a non-vaccination policy and the then eight EU countries which vaccinated cattle preventively, were asked to ban this preventive vaccination. This decision was preceded by an economic study comparing a stamping-out policy as employed in four Member States with a vaccination and stamping-out policy, employed by the remaining eight States (4). The costs of implementing the two alternative policies were compared. The analysis required a prediction of the number of outbreaks that would occur over a ten-year period under the two alternative policies, based on the experience of Member States already employing the two strategies under comparison. The outcome was a prediction that a non-vaccination policy would result in between 13 and 1,963 (central estimate 273) outbreaks over the ten year period (Table I ) compared with an estimate of between 20 and 3,020 -central estimate 420 -outbreaks for a policy based on vaccination (not shown). 
Foot and mouth disease outbreaks in Europe from 1991 to 2000
Since 1991, FMD has regularly been introduced into Europe (8, 9, 10, 11, 17, 18 (Table II) .
The history of individual outbreaks and the measures taken for controlling the disease are reviewed below.
Bulgaria 1991
The type O outbreak which occurred in Bulgaria in July 1991 at the border with Turkey was brought under control by stamping-out of all animals on infected premises and by ring vaccination.
Italy 1993
The epidemic of 53 cases (type O) which occurred in Italy followed the introduction of cattle via Prosecco, near Trieste, from a neighbouring country through the port of Bari. The cattle were destined for slaughterhouses in the Basilicata and Campania Regions but some were sold to farmers, mainly in the south, except for one shipment, which after a short time in the south, went to the Roverchiara district of Verona Province in the north-east. When the cattle entered Italy, they were accompanied by animal health certificates which were later shown to be false. The real origin of the imported cattle and how or where they became infected has not been established but the sequencing by the World Reference Laboratory (WRL) for FMD of a portion of the genome of the virus and comparison with sequences for other contemporary type O viruses indicated a Middle Eastern origin.
Bulgaria 1993
The outbreak in Bulgaria occurred in cattle near the village of Simeonovgrad, Haskovo Region, about 60 km from the border with Turkey. The disease was brought under control by stamping-out.
Russia 1993
One type A FMD outbreak was reported in cattle in Russia in the vicinity of the All Russian Research Institute for Animal Health (ARRIAH), Vladimir, due to a leakage of virus from the Institute. This was controlled immediately by a combination of stamping-out and ring vaccination.
Greece 1994
A major outbreak of type O occurred in Greece in August 1994. five outbreaks in Evros were considered as having another origin and virus was probably re-introduced.
Russia 1995
One type O FMD outbreak in pigs was reported in Russia in the vicinity of Moscow in June 1995. All pigs on the infected farm, totalling 5,800, had been vaccinated first and were later slaughtered and buried within the infected perimeter. The following additional measures were taken:
-disinfection and sanitation measures were implemented on the infected premises -all pigs, bovines and small ruminants in the Moscow region were revaccinated.
Restriction measures were lifted at the end of July and the territory of Russia was again declared free of FMD. The likely origin of the outbreak was contaminated imported meat from the Far East. The Veterinary Services of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia reported FMD in Kosovo, close to the border with Macedonia on 7 July. In total, 101 villages were declared infected and a stamping-out policy was applied. The last report dates to 2 August. However this was not confirmed by the expert mission which visited the country in October and no infected animals were detected by serology.
Turkish Thrace 1995
The EUFMD/FAO and EC supported the countries in the control of the disease and a regional strategy was adopted and implemented under the guidance of European experts. This is a good example of how the disease can be rapidly and efficiently controlled with a combination of stamping-out and ring vaccination. The example also demonstrates that a regional co-ordinated approach to the control of an FMD outbreak involving several countries is essential ( Turkish Thrace, Bulgaria and Greece 1996 According to the Authorities in Greece, there were three primary incursions of FMD along a 60 km front of the Evros River. In all cases, the working hypothesis for transmission was direct or indirect contact with animals across the border. Spreading of FMD to Xanthi was due to the 'human factor'.
Eradication of FMD was achieved by applying a stampingout/non-vaccination policy and verified by serological investigation (12) .
Summary of the foot and mouth disease outbreaks in Europe between 1991 and 2000
The non-vaccination policy has been in operation in Europe for more than ten years and Table I ). However, the EC prediction had been prepared for the then twelve EU member countries and the above calculation refers to 40 countries in Europe and includes EU and non-EU countries. Until the end of 2000, the number of secondary outbreaks following primary outbreaks was equal to 15.3 (322/21), which is less than the estimate of the EC scenario indicated in Table I (20 secondary outbreaks following primary outbreaks).
The number of primary and secondary outbreaks observed is therefore roughly in accordance with EC expert predictions and the change of policy towards non-vaccination did not result in an increase in the incidence of FMD. It must be underlined that the events of 2001 in the UK and in Europe are not related to the modification of the FMD policy in 1991: the UK never practised preventive vaccination of cattle and the spread of the disease within the UK and later to Ireland, France and Netherlands occurred mainly by movements of sheep which were also not previously vaccinated.
The non-vaccination policy adopted by the EC and other countries in Europe was, therefore, considered as appropriate until the major outbreak in the UK in 2001. Between 1991 and 2000, despite the 21 introductions of FMD from infected countries surrounding Europe, the outbreaks were controlled rapidly on each occasion either by stamping-out only or by stamping-out associated with ring vaccination (Table III) and always with limited spread and at low cost ( Fig. 1 and 
The outbreak of foot and mouth disease in the United Kingdom and in Europe in 2001
The United Kingdom
The last outbreak of FMD on the British mainland was in 1967/1968. The source was attributed to infected sheep meat imported from Argentina. The outbreak was controlled by stamping-out. Control of the outbreak involved the slaughter of some 400,000 animals at a cost, in current terms, of around 1.75 billion pounds sterling. The disease and the virus were eradicated within six months. In recent years, the main threat of the introduction of FMD into the United Kingdom has been perceived to be from incursions overland from the periphery of western Europe.
In The movement of infected sheep from Northumberland through a series of markets resulted in extensive spread in the north-west and south-west of England. Additional movements of sheep resulted in the dissemination of the virus to Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, Republic of Ireland and France. Calves that had been in contact with sheep imported into France from the UK spread the virus to the Netherlands (Fig. 7) . A summary of the consequences of the episodes in the different countries is provided in Table IV .
The clinical signs were extremely mild in the vast majority of outbreaks involving sheep. The average number of sheep displaying lesions within a single flock was less than 5%. The lesions occurred mainly in the mouths of sheep. A small minority of sheep exhibited foot lesions or lameness. The virus caused severe clinical disease in cattle and pigs (15) .
Western Europe
The disease spread through animal movement -mainly sheep -from Great Britain to Northern Ireland (4 foci), the Republic 
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New evaluation of the threat of introduction of foot and mouth disease into Europe after the outbreak in 2001
Lessons to be learnt from past outbreaks in Europe It is important to underline the difficulties encountered by investigators -Veterinary Services -when trying to determine the exact origin of FMD outbreaks and the source of the virus. All European countries -and other countries around the world -have laws and regulations on import and animal movements that, if properly implemented, should prevent the introduction of FMD and other exotic diseases. Therefore, any introduction of FMDV is always the result of illegal action. In this situation, those who are responsible for introduction of the disease will be very reluctant to provide information and when they agree to do so, they rarely tell the full story. This is also the case for the outbreak which occurred in the UK in 2001. The origins mentioned in Table V must therefore be regarded only as being the most likely explanation. However, sometimes the truth is made known later -after several years -when those responsible no longer risk prosecution.
Meat and animal products originating from infected animals imported legally or, more often, illegally, remain a major risk for introduction of the virus. The FMD situation in South America, traditionally an exporter of meat to Europe, had considerably improved between the 1980s and 2000 when FMDV reoccurred in Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil. During the last two decades, imports of beef to Europe from this continent were considered as relatively safe, especially since EUFMD guidelines and EC legislation required maturation and deboning of imported beef (3, 9) . As demonstrated in recent years, the major risk for Europe is associated with animals and meat imported or smuggled from Asia or the Middle East and possibly Africa, but not from South America.
If the rules on prohibition of swill-feeding to pigs are not strictly followed, there is a high risk of spread of FMDV through imported meat. It is important to recall that the introduction of the disease to Albania in 1996 and to the UK in 2001 -both resulting in major epidemics -are probably related to swill-or waste-feeding of pigs.
The risk associated with movement of people -tourists and immigrants -originating from FMD-infected countries has often been considered as high for Europe. However this route of introduction of FMDV has never been demonstrated in Europe in the past twenty years. Controls of travellers at points of entry into European countries are weak in comparison with the very strict controls imposed on travellers entering the United States of America and Australia for example. Meat and meat products may be illegally introduced in the luggage of travellers. Fortunately, these products are not systematically infected with FMDV and furthermore, they are usually consumed in urban areas. Under such situations, the probability of FMDV introduction is low and the probability that pigs will be fed the infected product is insignificant. Prohibition of swill-feeding to pigs contributes significantly to eliminating the chain of transmission by this route.
The risk of escape of FMDV from a laboratory is low as long as EUFMD/EC/OIE biosafety measures are followed (21) . Only laboratories which fulfil these measures are authorised to manipulate FMDV and virulent material in Europe. Guidelines for biosecurity measures in FMD laboratories were formulated by EUFMD Commission in 1993 (8) and a list of the laboratories and vaccine manufacturers authorised to manipulate FMD virus in the EU is annexed to Directive No. 85/511/EC.
Geopolitical changes in the last decades and their implications on foot and mouth disease risk to Europe
The opening of borders and liberalisation of trade have contributed to increasing the risk of introduction and spread of FMDV.
The dismantling of the communist block in the early nineties resulted in large increases in the movement of animals and animal products within the countries of the region and towards western countries in Europe (see 'Foot and mouth disease in the Community of Independent States and central Asia' below).
Free movements of commodities, including live animals and animal products, between the EU countries also increases the risk of spreading diseases. This was observed on several occasions for classical swine fever and recently, for FMD introduced into continental Europe by infected sheep transported from the UK. However, the utilisation of an animal movement control system (ANIMO) for notification of movements of live animals within the EU -notification by regional veterinary services of the place of origin of the animals to the place of destination -contributes to better tracing of these movements and to reducing the risk of spread of diseases. The system worked well during the last outbreak in Europe and allowed the tracing of sheep moved in the weeks preceding the outbreak in the UK. This tracing, often followed by pre-emptive culling, contributed to reducing the spread of the disease in continental Europe.
Effect of the absence of foot and mouth disease in Europe during the last twenty years
The absence of FMD in most of the European countries for more than twenty years had a negative impact on the level of awareness of the different stakeholders involved in FMD control. When considering surveillance, most farmers, veterinary practitioners and veterinary inspectors have never seen FMD. Within the veterinary services, some countries experienced a substantial reduction of staff devoted to animal health activities while public health and food safety activities were prioritised. In the last ten years, surveillance and control of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) was given top priority in Europe and limited resources and attention were given to surveillance for exotic diseases including FMD.
Husbandry practices and sociological factors
Three factors are perceived to increase the likelihood of spreading FMD virus if the disease happens to be introduced, as follows:
-long distance animal trading which may introduce disease from outside the region and contribute to its dissemination within the region; the EU rules for protection of animals during transport may increase the risk of spread through contact with other animals during the prescribed rest periods. This was observed for calves transported from Ireland to the Netherlands with a stop-over in France and is, according to the Dutch authorities, the origin of the outbreak in the Netherlands -dense populations of livestock which facilitates subsequent spread of the virus -markets which have always played a major role in the dissemination of the virus.
The recent epidemic of FMD in the UK confirms the risk related to the transport of live animals over long distances, often in association with markets. Sheep markets in the UK dramatically amplified the spread of the virus prior to the disease being recognised.
Public opinion pays increasing attention to the livestock industry and the rationale behind decisions taken concerning animal welfare and animal health and such decisions are often challenged. The question on the use of vaccination for controlling the recent epizootic in Europe and reducing the number of animals to be slaughtered, became a matter of public debate in 2001.
Some religious festivities also increase the risk of dissemination of diseases. This is well known in Muslim countries but the episode in Europe in 2001 revealed for the first time the extensive movements of animals, and particularly of sheep, from different origins which take place in the week preceding Hadj. This trade was responsible for the introduction of the virus from the UK to France.
The threat and risk factors identified above can be alleviated using three lines of defence, as indicated below.
First: preventing the entry of the virus
-by increasing security at the borders so as to prevent disease entering the region; reinforcement of control of illegal introduction of animal products is a high priority in Europe -by promoting an awareness of the threat of disease amongst veterinarians and livestock owners and traders; the last epidemic in Europe revealed that this awareness must concern not only the farming community but also the public in general -by developing herd and animal identification systems and effective movement certification procedures.
Second: ensuring prompt diagnosis and control should the disease be introduced
-by contingency planning to ensure that the disease is clinically recognised and that resources are available to meet disease emergencies; the delay in recognition and reporting of the first case is critical and determines the size of the outbreak -by maintaining adequate diagnostic facilities.
Third: being prepared to cope with the worst scenario -by preparing scenarios for different types of husbandry and especially for highly populated areas/farms -by validating these scenarios by simulation exercises -by preparing a contingency vaccination plan, also with different scenarios -by advance evaluation of economic consequencesparticularly relating to trade -of the different scenarios -by ensuring that a source of vaccine is permanently available (vaccine/antigen bank).
Management of particular risk factors
Control actions that affect normal commercial farming activities can be very costly and disruptive and are therefore difficult to impose and implement. For example, closure of markets at an early stage of the disease is of major importance as demonstrated in the UK in 2001 where a delay of few days had dramatic effect in spreading of the disease.
The sale of sheep for religious festivities should be officially controlled. Sheep must be submitted to inspection and their origin clearly identified.
Swill-feeding should be prohibited.
Foot and mouth disease in the Commonwealth of Independent States and Central Asia
During the existence of the Soviet Union and until the early 1990s, the FMD situation in this region was favourable. This was due to two important factors: the Iron Curtain which had a de facto strong influence on preventing the transboundary movements of animals and the vaccination zone established in the high-risk areas of the southern border of the Soviet Union (Caucasian and Asian borders). The dismantling of the Soviet Union resulted in the opening of the borders and in a progressive reduction in the resources of the National Veterinary Services in the newly independent Republics of the CIS which replaced the Soviet Union. Considering this dangerous situation, Russia continued to coordinate the activities of surveillance and control of FMD in the region. The ARRIAH, Vladimir, an OIE Reference Laboratory, plays a major role in surveillance and control in the region. However the resources available locally for vaccination campaigns were not sufficient to maintain the buffer zones which existed in the Caucasian region and in the Central Asian Republics at the time of the Soviet Union. Foot and mouth disease was re-introduced to the region as a result of these negative factors. However the global risk of spread from Caucasian region to Russia and Europe is limited (20) .
At the request of Russia and of the ARRIAH, an international project for establishing an FMD buffer zone was developed in Trans-Caucasian countries in 1999 and 2000 (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia) by the EUFMD-FAO and financed by the EC. The project was monitored by a Tripartite Group comprising the OIE, the FAO and the EC. During the abovementioned period, efforts were made in Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan to eradicate FMD foci and prevent further spread of the disease.
Despite the buffer zone project, FMD persists in the Caucasian region ( Fig. 8 and Table VI) as follows:
-type A (similar to A/Iran/96) was identified in Georgia in 1998 (13 outbreaks) and in Armenia (2 outbreaks). The disease 
Conclusion
The foot and mouth disease situation in the CIS and particularly in the Caucasian region and Central Asian
Republics is cause for concern because of the lack of resources of the countries involved.
In Europe, the FMD situation was satisfactory until 2001 but recent events have revealed that introduction of the disease may have dramatic consequences. Therefore every effort must be made to reduce the threat of FMD by taking appropriate measures sufficiently early within each country -i.e. before any immediate threat occurs -for the benefit of Europe as a whole. All European countries should have a contingency plan based either on the model prepared by the European Commission or that described by the EUFMD Commission. The main element of these plans is to ensure adequate resources to meet disease emergencies. Such plans should be subjected to regular audit to ensure that they are viable in changing circumstances and should be validated by simulation exercises.
The level of awareness of the different stakeholders plays a major role in the early detection of FMD. After little or no FMD in western Europe over the last twenty years, awareness of the disease has decreased dangerously. To improve the level of awareness, training and information are needed. Simulation exercises should be encouraged to verify that the different steps of contingency plans are really in place.
As most of the OIE List A diseases are now exotic to Europe, it is worthwhile considering FMD surveillance in a broader programme which would include the surveillance of all exotic diseases and not only FMD. 
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Repaso de la situación de la fiebre aftosa y métodos de control y erradicación en Europa y Asia Central
Y. Leforban & G. Gerbier
Resumen Tras describir la evolución que ha seguido la fiebre aftosa en Europa en los últimos 70 años, los autores examinan el origen de la enfermedad y los métodos para luchar contra ella, especialmente desde que a principios de la década de 1990 quedó prohibido en Europa el uso de vacunaciones preventivas. Desde entonces y hasta 2001, y pese a las reiteradas incursiones del virus, siempre se ha logrado contener y erradicar con rapidez la enfermedad. De ahí se deduce que la prohibición que pesa sobre las vacunaciones no ha provocado un aumento del número de brotes de fiebre aftosa. Sin embargo, los tremendos episodios infecciosos que asolaron el Reino Unido en 2001, cifrados en 2.030 brotes, abrieron una serie de interrogantes sobre la política aplicada hasta la fecha en Europa para controlar la enfermedad. En el futuro convendría contemplar el uso de la vacunación perifocal como posible alternativa a la práctica de sacrificios masivos. Basándose en la procedencia del virus que se introdujo recientemente en Europa, los autores repasan las grandes líneas del sistema de defensa y concluyen que sería necesario apuntalarlo para reducir el riesgo de que la enfermedad penetre de nuevo en el continente. Los autores tratan asimismo la situación de la fiebre aftosa en la Comunidad de Estados Independientes (CEI). Tras el hundimiento de la Unión Soviética, y pese a los incesantes esfuerzos de Rusia por ayudar a las repúblicas centroasiáticas y caucásicas, la situación ha ido empeorando en esos países. Para evitar que la fiebre aftosa adquiera carácter endémico en la región es indispensable el apoyo internacional.
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